Commonweal or Woe - The Ethics of Welfare Reform by O\u27Neill, William R.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 11
Issue 2 Symposium on Entitlements Article 5
1-1-2012
Commonweal or Woe - The Ethics of Welfare
Reform
William R. O'Neill
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
William R. O'Neill, Commonweal or Woe - The Ethics of Welfare Reform, 11 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 487 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol11/iss2/5
COMMONWEAL OR WOE? THE ETHICS OF
WELFARE REFORM
WiLIrAM R. O'NEILL, SJ.*
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are
caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a
single garment of destiny.
Martin Luther King
1
In Robert Bolt's play, A Man for All Seasons, the aging Cardi-
nal Wolsey admonishes Sir Thomas More: "You're a constant
regret to me, Thomas. If you could just see the facts flat on, with-
out that horrible moral squint; with just a little common sense,
you could have been a statesman."2 In Wolsey's eyes, More's
moral fastidiousness obscures the legal realm where the "facts" of
power and privilege must be seen "flat on." Wolsey's heirs are
quick to upbraid our latter-day Mores for their sentimental
"moral squint" at welfare reform. Yet even the least sentimental
of interpretations is never given tout court; for if measurements
of poverty, in Amartya Sen's words, represent "an exercise of
description assessing the predicament of people in terms of the
prevailing standards of necessities, "3 our assessments themselves
typically betray our tacit evaluations or prejudices (pre-
judgments) .'
Our disputes, that is, pose questions not only of allocative
efficiency, e.g., the relative utility of block grants in the Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, but of the
very moral and political aims welfare policy is intended to serve.
In these pages, I will accordingly first consider the moral geneal-
ogy of our welfare policy in light of the more salient provisions of
the newly enacted legislation. I will then offer a comparative
* Associate Professor of Social Ethics at the Jesuit School of Theology at
Berkeley and the Graduate Theological Union.
1. Martin Luther King, Letterfrom Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 290
(James M. Washington ed., 1986).
2. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 19 (1990).
3. AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINEs: AN ESSAY ON ENTITEMENT AND
DEPRIVATION 21 (1981).
4. For a non-pejorative interpretation of prejudice (praejudicium), see
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 265-307 (Joel Weinsheimer and
Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d ed. 1991).
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appraisal of the principal themes of Roman Catholic social teach-
ing as it pertains to welfare policy. Finally, I will propose a set of
moral criteria for the formulation of an equitable policy drawing
upon both general ethical and distinctively religious warrants
and backing.5
THE MORAL PREMISES OF WELFARE POLICY
As its very title attests, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 invokes a particular
moral rationale, albeit one often obscured in the babel of con-
tending voices. Welfare is essentially a pis aller;, for the Act's pro-
ponents, poverty's persistence represents at best, ill-fortune in
life's natural lottery, and at worst, an abdication of individual
responsibility. Like distinctive variations on a theme, such views
reflect the dominant motifs of our liberal, philosophic heritage,
i.e., the primacy of what Isaiah Berlin terms our "negative lib-
erty," the eclipse of the traditional, religious ideal of the com-
mon good, and the voluntaristic view of social obligation
underwriting our distinction of the "deserving" and "undeserving
poor."6 Our emerging policy, I wish to argue, exhibits an elec-
tive affinity with these themes; the "common sense" of our states-
men dispelling any suspicion that the natural lottery might be
rigged.7
Our modern world, remarked Max Weber, is disenchanted,
for the "ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from
public life."8 The "retreat" of the medieval ideal of the common
good (bonum commune) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries heralded the rise of a new school of natural law in which the
"liberties of the moderns" reigned supreme.9 While for Aquinas,
"the common good is the end of each individual member of the
community," for the modern social-contract theorists, influenced
by nominalist legal theory, social obligation is voluntaristically
5. I am indebted to ThomasJ. Massaro, S.J. and WilliamJ. Hutchison, S.J.
for their invaluable analyses.
6. ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118,
122 (1969).
7. In appealing to Weber's conception of "elective affinity," I wish to show
the legitimating influence of certain modern attitudes and beliefs without
assuming that our particular policies are fully explained by them. See MAX
WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAX WEBER, 267-301
(H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills trans. and eds., 1946).
8. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER, supra note 7, at
155.
9. Benjamin Constant, De la liberti des anciens comparie d celle des modernes,
in OEUVRES POLITIQUES DE BENJAMIN CONSTANT, (C. Louandre ed., 1874).
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incurred.' ° Social bonds, once the fruition of the natural telos or
finality of liberty (libertas), are now depicted as the outcome of
individual choice (liberum arbitrium), whether of Locke's fiduciary
contract or the sovereign fiat of Hobbes's Leviathan. No longer
"naturally" ordained to the common good, "the only freedom
which deserves the name," says John Stuart Mill, "is that of pursu-
ing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt
to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it." 11
The very plurality of our particular ends leads us, remarks
Berlin, to "place such immense value upon the freedom to
choose."12 In John Rawls's "political liberalism," for instance,
mutually disinterested, rational choosers behind the "veil of igno-
rance" recognize the lexical priority of individual liberty in pref-
erence to the increment of any other social good. Society is itself
conceived as a compact of "mutual advantage" in which self-inter-
ested agents are bound by formal, procedural constraints of jus-
tice as fairness in pursuit of their "conflicting, and indeed
incommensurable conceptions of the good."1 " The primacy of
individual preference, limited by the like liberties of other indi-
vidual agents, thus restricts appeals to social benevolence in the
design of society's basic institutions; in accordance with the heu-
ristic ideal of the social contract, one is not "naturally" obliged to
redress the fortunes of society's least favored members. In Emer-
son's memorable words, "Do not tell me, as a good man did
today, of my obligation to put all poor men in good situations.
Are they my poor?"14
The priority of individuals' negative liberty as our foremost
natural or human right, in turn, determines the nature and
scope of liberal rights' theory. "Positive" delimitations of individ-
uals' liberty, e.g., as in basic entitlements or welfare rights to
nutritional well-being, health care, or employment opportunities
are relegated to an inferior sphere or dismissed as an "exercise of
rhetorical license."" Our negative liberties, writes Robert
10. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA TIIEOLOGIAE II-fl, Ques. 58, art. 7, 9. For an
analysis of the role of nominalism in legal theory, see Louis DuPRk, PASSAGE TO
MODERNrIY: AN EsSAY IN THE HERMENEUTFICS OF NAruRE AND CULTURE 12044
(1993).
11. JoHN STUART Mnj, ON LIBERTY 72 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974).
12. BERLIN, supra note 6, at 168.
13. JoHN RAwis, PoLITcCAL LIBERALISM 99-107 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLs,
PoLrrcAL LIBERALISM]; John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, Political not Metaphysical,
14 PHIL. & PUB. AlT. 225 (1985). Cf JoHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 4, 83
(1971) [hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTCE].
14. RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in EssAYS AND LECruR 261-62
(1983).
15. JoEL FEINBERG, SOcIAL PHILOsoPHY 66-67 (1973).
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Nozick, "fill the space of rights," while duties corresponding to
such rights chiefly enjoin forbearance.16 So it is, the predica-
ment of greater hunger for fourteen million children and their
families with the recent reduction in food stamp benefits by $28
billion over the next six years,' 7 or of the denial of Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) to an estimated 315,000 children with dis-
abilities, 40,000 to 50,000 of whom will likewise lose Medicaid
benefits, was not regarded as an important ethical failure. 18
A loosening of the moral reins thus ensues in the public
realm as we "withdraw into the circle of family and friends; with
this little society formed to [our] own taste," in Tocqueville's
words, we "gladly leave the greater society to look after itself." 9
Vast inequalities of wealth and income, unprecedented in the
modem period, are deemed just; for if, as is generally assumed,
our basic social institutions abide by fair and impartial rules, pov-
erty can no longer be regarded as morally tragic, i.e., as a failure
of moral entitlement or right.2 ° Succor of the "deserving poor,"
e.g., the widows and their young children who were the original
beneficiaries of the Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) program
(Title IV of the Social Security Act of August 14, 1935), is thus
perhaps best viewed along the axis of Hohfeld'sjural correlatives
of "privilege and no-right," rather than of "duty and right."2
For, in general, even the "deserving poor" lack moral claim-rights
against the State to ensure the satisfaction of basic "positive"
16. ROBERT Nozicx, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 238 (1974).
17. Half of the food stamp cuts will affect households with incomes below
half the poverty line (6,250 for a family of three), while about two-thirds of the
cuts will be borne by families with children. Three-hundred thousand legal
immigrant children will lose food stamps entirely. The Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, The Depth of the New Food Stamp Cuts in the New Welfare Law (Aug.
16, 1996); How the Welfare Act will Work, CDF REP. (Children's Defense Fund,
Washington D.C.) Sept. 1996, at 8.
18. How the Welfare Act Will Work, supra note 17, at 5, 8; cf DAVID A. SUPER
ET AL., Tim NEw WELFARE LAW (Washington D.C.: Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 1996), 29-30.
19. ALExIS DE ToCQUEVILLE, DEmocRAcy IN AMERICA 506 (George
Lawrence trans., J. P. Mayer ed., 1969).
20. In 1993, the lowest quintile of income earners received 4% of all
income and owned 7% of all wealth in the U.S. The highest quintile received
49% of the income and owned 44% of the wealth; the income share of the
lowest 40% declined from 15% in 1974 to 13% in 1994, while those of the top
quintile rose from 44% to 49%; and for the decade 1980-1990, the increased
income of the wealthiest 2.5 million Americans equaled the total income of the
poorest 50 million. U.S. Census Bureau, cited in Marc J. Cohen & Don Reeves,
The Raging Debate About U.S. Poverty, in WHAT GovERNMEmrs CAN Do: SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF TIM STATE OF WORLD HUNGER 42-43 (1996).
21. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HoIFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
36-40 (1964).
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claims to well-being,2" i.e., what Sen terms persons' capabilities to
achieve valuable functionings. 23 AFDC benefits did not, for
instance, suffice to raise a family above the official poverty line;
24
yet with the rescinding of these legal entitlements, 1.1 million
additional children, the majority in working families, will likely
succumb to poverty.
25
The onus, indeed, falls upon the poor to show that they are
worthy of society's largess. With the voluntaristic attenuation of
social obligation, discrimination of the "deserving" from the
"undeserving poor" rests, I surmise, in our social typifications. 26
While ADC was lauded for preserving the traditional familial role
of women, women's greater participation in the labor market,
and the rising percentage of single mothers and out-of-wedlock
children on AFDC altered our assessments of their predica-
ment.27 Unlike widows, single mothers were more readily stigma-
tized as irresponsible, idle, and promiscuous; their child-rearing
no longer regarded as honorable work.28 Dismantling racial bar-
riers to participation in welfare programs in the 1960s, moreover,
seemed something of a pyrrhic victory; for as recipients differing
from the ideal-typical beneficiary of ADC increased, so too did
the likelihood of their being classified as "undeserving." In Rob-
ert Wuthnow's words, "[a] 11 too often," the character of the poor
22. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities notes that between "1990
and 1992 when unemployment climbed, federal AFDC expenditures rose $6
billion above the amount expended in 1989. The Bill's 'contingency fund',
however, includes only $2 billion - or one-third as much. The contingency
funds are likely to run out part way into the next recession." Restrictive criteria,
moreover, apply to the allocation of such funds. SUPER ET AL., supra note 18 at 1-
2, 9-10.
23. See AMAR-ryA SEN, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUAl= OF LIFE 30-
53 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
24. In the early 1990's, no state offered AFDC benefits that raised their
families above 80% of the official poverty line. Indeed, in the least generous
states, the figure approaches 40%. The average AFDC family of three in 1994
received cash and Food Stamp benefits that raised it to two-thirds of the poverty
line. SHARON PARROT-r, How MucH Do WE SPEND ON WELFARE (1995).
25. JOHN T. COOK & LAURA P. Si-ERMAN, ECONOMIC SECURITY AMONG
AMERICA'S POOR: TiH IMPACT OF STATE WELFARE WAIVERS ON ASSET
ACCUMULATION (1996); Cf SUPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 3, 31.
26. For an analysis of typification in the social sciences, see Maurice
Natanson, Phenomenology and Typification: A Study in the Philosophy of Alfred Schutz,
37 Soc. Rxs. 1-22 (1970).
27. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994).
28. See NANCY FRASER, Women, Welfare and the Politics of Need Interpretation,
in UNRULY PRACTICES: POWER, DISCOURSE AND GENDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL
THEORY 144 (1989).
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is diminished implicitly in efforts to account for their situa-
tion in the first place. They symbolize the opposite of char-
acter traits thought to be the basis of middle-class success
and security. The poor are thus credited ... with limited
intelligence, an inability to plan, having made bad choices,
falling in with bad friends or marrying irresponsible part-
ners, being weak-willed with respect to drugs and alcohol,
or simply being lazy.
29
Consonant, of course, with the discrimination of "deserving"
and "undeserving poor" is the enlarged scope of private charity.
The voluntary, religious sector of civil society orchestrates our
social pity; yet the public drama, one might say, is not of equal
protagonists before the law, but of those rendered supplicants to
their benefactors. Religious voices occupy the interstices of "the
greater society," yet figure only incidently in securing the justice
of its basic institutions. As Robert Wuthnow observes, religious
sentiments temper our venality, yet do little to inspire institu-
tional economic reform."0 Indeed, for Rawls, distinctively reli-
gious traditions of justice, inasmuch as they rest on richer
conceptions of the commonweal, imperil the "overlapping con-
sensus" of a modern, pluralist democracy3 1 in what Weber
presciently described as our "godless and prophedess time."32
MOTIFS OF ROMAN CATHOLIC SocIAL TEACHING
Although critics of the new welfare policy speak of the fray-
ing of our social contract, the very idea of a compact of abstract,
socially disenfranchised individuals, as we have seen, already rep-
resents a considerable attenuation of earlier notions of covenan-
tal fidelity to the commonweal. Inspired by the great biblical
injunctions of justice or righteousness (sedaqah) and right judg-
ment (misphat) marking the reign of God, modern Roman Cath-
olic social teaching recurs to the social ideal of the common
good in elaborating its structural critique.3 3 In their notable pas-
toral letter, Economic Justice for A14 issued in 1986, and in subse-
quent pronouncements on the economy and welfare, the Roman
Catholic bishops of the U.S. sought to apply the heritage of their
29. ROBERT WuTNow, GOD AND MAMMON IN AMERIcA 216 (1994).
30. Id. at 198-221.
31. RAwIs, PoLrcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 13, at 133-72.
32. WEBER, supra note 8, at 153.
33. For an interpretation of biblical conceptions of justice, see John
Donahue, Biblical Perspectives on Justice, in THE FAITH THAT DoEs JusncE 68-112
(John C. Haughey ed., 1977).
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social teaching to the culturally diverse and religiously pluralist
American polity.
Since the first modem social encyclical, Leo XIII's Rerum
Novarum (1891), the Church's magisterial teaching has upheld
the fundamental, intrinsic worth of persons as created in the
"image of God." Earlier perfectionist interpretations of human
finality, consistent with an organically conceived social hierarchy,
have, in recent teaching, ceded to a more deontological appeal
to moral persons' equal dignity and rights. John XXIII thus
affirms in his encyclical Pacem in Terris,
Any human society, if it is to be well-ordered and produc-
tive, must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely,
that every human being is a person; that is, his nature is
endowed with intelligence and free will. Indeed, precisely
because he is a person he has rights and obligations flow-
ing directly and simultaneously from his very nature. And
as these rights and obligations are universal and inviolable,
so they cannot in any way be surrendered.3 4
Pope John invokes both norms of reason and of Revelation:
If we look upon the dignity of the human person in the
light of divinely revealed truth, we cannot help but esteem
it far more highly; for men are redeemed by the blood of
Jesus Christ, they are by grace the children and friends of
God and heirs of eternal glory.
3 5
The recognition and institutional protection of persons' dig-
nity sets the framework of social policy on welfare. The United
States Catholic Conference, while critical of the status quo ante,
asserts that "for the Catholic community, the measure of welfare
reform is whether it will enhance the lives and dignity of poor
children and their families."'36  The equal recognition and
respect due moral persons in virtue of their dignity is, in turn,
parsed in terms of agents' basic human rights. So it is, the dis-
course of human rights serves as a lingua franca in mediating the
Church's theological beliefs regarding covenantal fidelity in a
religiously pluralist context. In the words of the bishops in their
1986 Pastoral Letter:
34. POPE JoHn. xxI, PACEM IN TERRS, para. 9 (1963), reprinted in
CATHouc SocIAL THOUGHT: THE DOcuMENTARY HERITAGE 132 (David J.
O'Brien & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992).
35. Id
36. Administrative Board, U.S. Catholic Conference, Moral Principles and
Policy Priorities on Welfare Reform, 24 ORIGINS 677 (1995) [hereinafter Moral
Principles]. Cf Catholic Charities USA, Transforming the Welfare System: A Position
Paper of Catholic Charities USA (1994).
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Catholic social teaching spells out the basic demands of
justice... in the human rights of every person. These fun-
damental rights are prerequisites for a dignified life in
community. The Bible vigorously affirms the sacredness of
every person as a creature formed in the image and like-
ness of God. The biblical emphasis on covenant and com-
munity also shows that human dignity can only be realized
and protected in solidarity with others.
3 7
The appeal to human dignity "in solidarity with others" thus
serves as a proximate foundation of human rights, ascertainable
by natural reason, and hence prior to positive legislative enact-
ments, constitutional arrangements, or judicial decisions, even as
dignity is itself founded upon a distinctively religious understand-
ing of creation and redemption. This complex foundation of
human rights permits the Church to speak prophetically to the
world while remaining rooted in the attitudes and beliefs of
Christian discipleship. In specifying the "minimum conditions"
for the realization of human dignity, the bishops seek to extend
the notion of human rights to encompass not merely the "nega-
tive" civil-political rights enshrined in our American tradition,
e.g., the freedoms from interference or coercion expressed in our
rights to freedom of worship, assembly, speech, etc., but the "pos-
itive" socio-economic rights of subsistence, employment, minimal
health care, education, etc.3 " The bishops thus conclude in their
Tenth Anniversary statement of Economic Justice for All, A Catholic
Framework for Economic Life, "All people have a right to life and to
secure the basic necessities of life (e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
education, health care, safe environment, economic secur-
ity).... Society has a moral obligation, including governmental
action where necessary, to assure opportunity, meet basic human
needs and pursue justice in economic life."3 9
Invoking dignity and human rights as the moral minima
reveals, moreover, that in adopting the modem language of
human rights the Church charts a via media between marxist
37. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOuC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JusTICE FOR
ALL (1986), reprinted in CATHOLIc SocIAL THOUGHT, supra note 34, at 597 para.
78 [hereinafter ECONODMC JUSTICE FOR ALL].
38. Id at 598.
39. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, A Catholic Framework for Economic
Life 26 OuGrNs 370 (1996) [hereinafter Catholic Framework]. While maintaining
that " [W] elfare reform should affirm the importance of marriage, strong intact
families, personal responsibility, self-discipline, sacrifice and basic morality," the
bishops insist that such reform "should help mothers and fathers meet the
social, economic, educational and moral needs of their children." Moral
Principles, supra note 36, at 676.
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socialism and laissez-faire liberalism.4 ° In the Roman Catholic
tradition, the common good entails neither the collectivist subor-
dination of the individual to a suprapersonal entity such as the
State, nor the reductive individualism of modern liberalism. For
the common good is conceived distributively, not en masse as
"the sum total of those conditions of social living" which protect
and promote the dignity and rights of every person.41 In a simi-
lar vein, the principle of subsidiarity provides for the distinctive
role of the mediating institutions of civil-society, e.g., the
churches, unions, and other voluntary associations, so that the
structural prerequisites of the common good are both equitably
and efficiently satisfied.42
As the foregoing remarks reveal, Roman Catholic social
teaching, despite its irenic tenor, offers a richer understanding of
the moral aims of social welfare policy than envisioned in the
recent legislation. The structural ideal of the common good,
mediated by the principle of subsidiarity, gives rise to a substan-
tive conception of justice whereby it is not so much fair proce-
dures that determine just outcomes, as an antecedent set of
material outcomes, i.e., the institutional fulfillment of persons'
basic human rights that render procedures just or fair. From the
earliest of the social encyclicals, a fair remuneration depended
not only upon the contractual agreements of commutative jus-
tice, but upon the strictures of distributive and social justice
which would ensure a "living wage." 4' The dignity of labor and
the rights of workers thus enjoyed pride of place in the encyclical
tradition. For work is conceived less in privative terms, than as
the characteristic mode of expressing persons' dignity and fulfil-
ling their contribution to the commonweal.
In an encyclical devoted to the moral import of labor,
Laborem Exercens, John Paul II affirms:
40. SeeJohn A. Coleman, S.J., Neither Liberal Nor Socialist: The Originality of
Catholic Social Teaching, in ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT:
CELEBRATION AND CHALLENGE 2542 (1991).
41. POPE JOHN XXIII, MATER ET MAGISTRA para. 65 (1961), reprinted in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 34, at 84, 94; see also PACEM IN TERRIS,
supra note 34, at paras. 55-61; SECoND VATICAN COUNCIL, GAUDIUM ET SPES para.
26 (1965), reprinted in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra, at 166, 181.
42. POPE PIUS Xfl, QUADRAGESIMO Argo paras. 79-80 (1931), reprinted in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHTW, supra note 34, at 42, 60; see also MATER ET
MAGISTRA, supra note 41, at paras. 51-58; ECONOICJUsTI cE FOR ALL, supra note
37, at paras. 96-101, 119-24.
43. For an analysis of the threefold understanding of justice in modern
Roman Catholic social teaching, see DAVID HOLLENBACH, Modern Catholic
Teaching Concerning Justice, in JUSTICE, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AMERiCAN
CATHOLIC SOCIAL ETHICS IN A PLURALISTIC CONTEXT 16-33 (1988).
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The word of God's revelation is profoundly marked by the
fundamental truth that [the human person], created in
the image of God, shares by his work in the activity of the
Creator and that, within the limits of his own human capa-
bilities, [the human person] in a sense continues to
develop that activity, and perfects it as he advances further
and further in the discovery of the resources and values
contained in the whole of creation.4 4
Welfare policy, accordingly, must enhance both the opportuni-
ties and quality of work as befits the essential dignity of the
laborer. In the words of the U.S. bishops:
Those who can work ought to work. Employment is the
expected means to support a family and make a contribu-
tion to the common good. Too often welfare discourages
work by eliminating health and child-care benefits for
those who leave the welfare rolls for the labor market.
Real reform will offer education, training and transitional
help to those who exchange a welfare check for a
paycheck. The challenge is to ensure that reform leads to
productive work with wages and benefits that permit a fam-
ily to live in dignity. Rigid rules and arbitrary time lines are
no substitute for real jobs at decent wages and the tax poli-
cies which can help keep families off welfare.4"
The social requisites of dignity pertain no less to those "who
cannot work or whose 'work' is raising our youngest children":
Society has a responsibility to help meet the needs of those
who cannot care for themselves, especially young children.
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps and
other entitlement programs provide essential support for
poor children. We will support more effective and respon-
sive federal-state-community partnerships, but we cannot
support "reform" that will make it more difficult for poor
children to grow into productive individuals. We cannot
support reform that destroys the structures, ends entitle-
ments and eliminates resources that have provided an
essential safety net for vulnerable children or permits states
to reduce their commitment in this area. Also, we cannot
support punitive approaches that target immigrants, even
legal residents, and take away the minimal benefits that
they now receive.4 6
44. POPE JoHN PAUL I, LABOREM EXERCENS para. 25 (1981), reprinted in
CATHouc SociAL THOUGHT, supra note 34, at 352, 385.
45. Moral Principles, supra note 36, at 676.
46. Id.
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As such, the welfare of the most vulnerable members of soci-
ety is fittingly understood as the touchstone of economic policy.
The U.S. bishops argue in the Tenth Anniversary statement of
Economic Justice for All 4 7 "[a] fundamental moral measure of any
economy is how the poor and vulnerable are faring .... All of
economic life should recognize the fact that we are all God's chil-
dren and members of one human family, called to exercise a
clear priority for 'the least among us."' 48 The latter, "preferen-
tial option for the poor," first adumbrated in Latin American lib-
eration theology, and subsequently incorporated in John Paul
II's encyclical, Sollicitudo rei socialis and the U.S. bishops' pastoral
letter on the economy, brings into relief the fundamental rights
of the poor in welfare policy deliberation.49 As a matter of basic
equity, the State cannot, then, abdicate its responsibility to
ensure the satisfaction of the legitimate claim rights of its least
favored members. While fully acknowledging the proper role of
states and localities, as well as of the mediating institutions of
civil society, e.g., the church-based charitable organizations, the
bishops nonetheless contend that "poverty has national dimen-
sions and consequences that require federal commitment and
national standards, safeguards and protections. The nation
needs to reform its welfare system, not abandon the federal gov-
ernment's role and responsibilities in fighting poverty."50
A MODEST PROPOSAL
The preceding precis of modem Roman Catholic social
teaching reveals the affinities and differences prevailing between
the Catholic bishops and the architects of our present welfare
policy. And although the bishops propose developing "a new
cultural consensus that the basic economic conditions of human
welfare are essential to human dignity and are due persons by
right," the temper of times seems rather to favor Wolsey's realism
than the bishops' "moral squint."51 In this concluding section, I
will accordingly offer a critical reconstruction of several, central
motifs of the Roman Catholic social tradition as a prelude to pro-
posing a modest set of criteria for evaluating welfare policy.
47. ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 37.
48. Catholic Framework, supra note 39, at 370-71.
49. POPE JOHN PAUL 1I, SOLICITUDO REi SOCIALIS paras. 42-43 (1987),
reprinted in CATHOuC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 34, at 395, 425-27; ECONOMIC
JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 37, at paras. 86-88.
50. Moral Principles, supra note 36, at 677.
51. EcONOMIc JusTIcE FOR ALL, supra note 37, at 598.
1997]
498 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 11
As we have seen, the essential dignity of persons in solidarity
remains the font of Roman Catholic social ethics. While a
detailed analysis of formal justification of attributing dignity to
agents as a supervenient property52 lies beyond the scope of this
essay, it suffices to observe that the "immense value" we place
upon our negative liberty itself presumes, in Berlin's words, that
we regard autonomous agency "as an end in itself, and not as a
temporary need."53 Even Rawls's original contract, as I have
argued elsewhere,54 departs from the ideal of a pure, procedural
justice in distinguishing agents' "highest-order interests" in the
realization of their "moral powers."55 The contracting parties,
that is, implicitly regard themselves as "free and equal" moral
agents, "all equally worthy of being represented" 6 as "moral per-
sons with a right to equal respect and consideration in the design
of their common institutions."5 7 The immunities from coercion
or interference recognized in the original position thus acquire
their moral salience from the antecedent supposition of respect
for moral persons as agents.
These comparatively richer moral premises enjoining
respect for moral agency serve as a general, ethical analogue for
the theological interpretation of human dignity in Roman Catho-
lic thought. Indeed, the very rhetorical practice of rational
claim-making, e.g., upholding our several negative liberties as
claim-rights, exhibits our moral equality as interlocutors. One is
reminded of Tocqueville's sage remark that
There is nothing which, generally speaking, elevates and
sustains the human spirit more than the idea of rights.
There is something great and virile in the idea of right
which removes from any request its suppliant character,
and places the one who claims it on the same level as the
one who grants it.58
52. See FF1NBERG, supra note 15, at 90. According to Feinberg, a
supervenient property is "a property possessed by something in virtue of some
other property or properties it possesses." Id. Thus, under a supervenient
property analysis, "[i]f one is more worthy than the other it must be because
they have different properties.... [and] if two things or two persons have the
same worth... they must have in common some characteristics... that is the
basis of their equal worth." Id.
53. BER.rN, supra note 6, at 168-69.
54. WimuAM R. O'NEnLL, S.J., TiH Emics OF OUR CLMATE 62-78 (1994).
55. John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theoy, 77 J. PHL. 525
(1980).
56. Id. at 533, 546.
57. John Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 Pn-L. REv. 536, 539 (1975).
58. ALEXLS DE TocouEvnILE & GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT, TOCQUEVILLE AND
BEAuMoNT ON SOCLAL RE oRm 17 (S. Drescher ed. & trans., Harper & Row
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Human rights, that is, express our moral self-knowledge as in Joel
Feinberg's words, "dignified objects of respect, both in [our]
own eyes and in the view of others."59
Now in ascribing worth, rather than mere price to persons as
agents, we implicitly valorize the prerequisites of their exercising
agency, i.e., not only our negative, civil liberties, but basic secur-
ity and subsistence.60 Alan Gewirth terms these "the generic
goods of agency," inasmuch as they are presupposed in any rea-
sonable conception of flourishing.6 Such goods embracing
both negative liberties and positive needs or welfare rights are
mutually implicatory, for they constitute the moral minima of
respect presumed in one's status as claimant. For what Rawls
terms the "fair value" of liberty is imperilled if persons' basic
right to adequate nutrition or security is denied.62 And so too,
one's right to security is threatened if liberties of effective partici-
pation in civic life are systemically suppressed. Preserving and
protecting persons' basic agential capabilities (as the pragmatic
analogue of libertas), rather than merely their negative liberties, is
thus a prerequisite of assessing moral responsibility. Censuring
1968), quoted in K R. Minogue, Natural Rights, Ideology and the Game of Life, in
NATURAL RIGHTS, IDEOLOGY AND THE GAME OF LIFE, in HuMAN RIGHTS 13, 34
(Eugene Kamenka & Alice Ehr-Soon Tay eds., 1977). Cf R.J. Vincent's
observation,
Not only are rights an important part of the language of morals, but
they have, too, a unique role within that language. It is to denote a
particular moral attitude. The demeanour of someone claiming his or
her rights is not that of begging of pleading, and the response if the
claim is met is not one of gratitude. Equally, if the claim is not met,
the response is not one of disappointment but of indignation. This is
because rights are insisted on as part of one's status as a person. They
are not favours done by the holders of power to those beholden to it.
P.J. VINCENT, HuMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 17 (1986) (cita-
tions omitted).
59. JOEL FEINBERG, supra note 15, at 58-59.
60. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN PouIcv 5-87 (1980).
61. AiAN GEWiRTH, HuMAN RIGHTS 41-78 (1982). By "reasonable" I
understand a conception of flourishing consistent with the status of the agent
as a "dignified object of respect." Cf RAWLS, POLrTCAL LABERALISM, supra note
13, at 58-66.
62. RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE, supra note 13, at 204-5, 224-27. Cf the
refined understanding of needs, capabilities, and functionings as defining the
moral minima of agency in the analyses of Amartya Sen & Martha C. Nussbaum
in WOMEN, CuLTuRE AND DEVELOPMENT (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathan
Glover eds., 1995), at 259-73, 61-115, 360-95 respectively.
1997] 499
500 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. II
"idleness" presumes the antecedent satisfaction of basic rights,
e.g., the potential of fitting, dignified employment.
63
The rhetoric of such basic rights thus illumines whatJfirgen
Habermas terms "systematic distortions" of our civic discourse.64
For the common good describes the set of basic, institutional
arrangements presumed for the discourse of free and equal
moral agents. Formally, each person is regarded as a worthy
interlocutor in determining the design of society's basic institu-
tions. Materially, such uncoerced civic discourse presumes the
institutional guarantees of a regime of basic human rights, for
the maxim of respect implies not only recognition of an agent's
particular point of view, but, since such views may reflect others'
coercive repression, due regard for her autonomous capacity to
form, revise, and act upon such a viewpoint.
65
Our moral entitlement to equal respect or consideration in
such a discursive rendering of the common good, in turn, justi-
fies preferential treatment for those whose basic rights are most
imperiled - in Camus' phrase, our taking "the victim's side."
66
For if equal consideration does not imply identical treatment, so
one may distinguish legitimately between indiscriminate regard
for moral persons and discriminate response to their differing
situations.6 Aquinas's observation that a servant who is ill merits
greater attention than a son who is not, pertains, a fortiori, to
equals: the fulfillment of equal basic rights, in materially dissimi-
lar conditions, justifies a discriminate response. 68 In social eth-
63. It is here, I believe, that my greatest difference with Lawrence M.
Mead rests, for in recognizing agential rights (both positive and negative), I
accord moral priority to persons' capabilities rather than mere functionings,
e.g., employment at substandard jobs. The former requires, as a matter of
fundamental justice or equity, that persons' basic capabilities to work be
sustained, e.g., through provision of appropriate education, job-training,
counseling, child care, etc. Insisting that persons work while neglecting these is
akin to saying "Rise, pick up your pallet and walk," without the obligatory
miracle. John 5:8-9.
64. See Jfirgen Habermas, The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality, in JOSEPH
BLmcHER, CoNrEMPoRARY HERMENEUTCS 190-203 (1980).
65. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, The Idea of Equality, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF
236-37 (1973).
66. ALBERT CAMus, THE PLAGUE 230 (Smart Gilbert trans., Alfred A.
Knopf Books 1948) (1947). In the present context, the term "victim" is an
evaluative moral description referring to those suffering deprivation of their
basic rights; as such, it is reducible neither to class membership nor to a
particular psychological state. I have developed this analysis in No Amnesty for
Sorrow: The Privilege of the Poor in Christian Social Ethics, 55 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 4
(1994).
67. See GENE OuTKA, AGAPE 20 (1972). Cf RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 227 (1978).
68. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMAE THEOLOGIAE II-fl, Q. 31, art. 3.
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ics generally, such a discriminate response is expressed in the
graduated moral urgency of differing human rights, i.e. the lexi-
cal priority of agents' basic rights over other, less exigent claims,
e.g. property rights; and in the differing material conditions pre-
sumed for realizing the same human rights. A regime of rights
may thus embody a legislative or juridical preference for the least
favored in society and differential material entitlements corre-
sponding to the differing intrapersonal and interpersonal pre-
requisites of agency, e.g. the greater nutritional needs of
pregnant women.69
These brief remarks permit us, I believe, to "translate" the
fundamental motifs of Roman Catholic social teaching into a
persuasive, discursive idiom, without thereby assuming the bur-
den of keeping "our metaphysics warm."70 For religious attitudes
and beliefs may supply an ultimate underpinning or backing of
our rights-warrants, while illuminating the immediate context of
their application through narrative, figure, or trope, e.g., the
Lukan parable of the Good Samaritan. 7  Let me conclude by
applying these general ethical tenets to the issue of welfare
reform in the form of policy criteria:
1. The basic, moral rights of agents enjoy a lexical priority
with respect to other less basic claims.
While such moral criteria do not suffice for the determina-
tion of specific policies, they establish the pertinent aims such
policies must serve. Children's rights to nutritional well-being
and basic health care thus become politically exigent; as moral
entitlements, they must be legally protected with appropriate
institutional guarantees. The significant reduction in nutritional
benefits in the new legislation (e.g., the $2.9 billion reduction in
child nutrition programs over the next six years, including the
Child and Adult Care Food Program (CACFP), in addition to the
massive reduction in food stamp benefits) is therefore especially
69. See JEAN DRtZE & AMAR1YA SEN, HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION 37-42
(1989).
70. T. S. ELIOT, Whispers of Immortality, in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS:
1909-1950 32, 33 (1962).
71. Pace Rawls, rather than an "overlapping consensus" in which religious
backing is "bracketed" in civic deliberation, we may speak of a fluid, "fusion of
horizons" in which consensus is mediated through the understanding of
difference, including the great religious traditions. See O'NEi LL, supra note 54,
at 129-48.
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worrisome,7 2 as are the capped funding provisions in the TANF
program and the insufficient allotment of contingency funds.7 3
2. Such basic, mutually implicatory claim-rights define a
moral minima for public policy.
Policies adopted by the states must ensure the most effective
means of implementation of persons' basic rights. Since no
transfers or trade-offs are permissible at this most basic level, pol-
icies must be comprehensive (encompassing all qualified per-
sons) and integral (addressing all pertinent claims). 74 Latitude
in developing state policies in a cooperative federalism should
not exacerbate the inequitable allocation of benefits (or bur-
dens) across states and localities characteristic of AFDC; neither
should residents (non-citizen immigrants) suffer the loss of basic
human rights.7 5 Consistent with the political aim of ensuring per-
sons' basic capabilities, legitimate incentives for employment,
while laudable, must be complemented with adequate resources
devoted to ensure training, education, job-counseling, place-
ment, and appropriate child care. Contrary to the restrictive two-
year limit of TANF, young, single mothers should not be forced
to work in the formal sector where this would redound to the
detriment of their children. 76 (The Office of Management and
Budget estimates that if states meet their new and higher welfare
72. SUPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 22-23. The Child and Adult Care Food
Program provides meals to children in child care centers and family day care
homes.
73. Special Report: Welfare Law, CDF REP. (Children's Defense Fund,
Washington D.C.), Sept 1996, at 5-6 [hereinafter Welfare Law]. Benefits are not
indexed for inflation. Similarly dubious from the perspective of basic rights are
the more restrictive criteria of childhood disability and the states' prerogative of
imposing family capping and a teenage mother exclusion. Id. at 7-8. See SUPER
ET AL., supra note 18, at 29-30.
74. For a rights-based analysis of priority principles for public policy, see
SHUE, supra note 60, at 111-19.
75. The new law permits states to reduce their share of the maintenance
of effort by 25% of their 1994 levels, or 80% for states failing to satisfy
mandatory work requirements. States may transfer 30% of their federal TANF
block grant funds to the Child Care and Development Block Grant and the
Social Services Block Grant (transfers to the latter alone may not exceed 10% of
a states's federal TANF block grant allocation). States, moreover, are permitted
to eliminate benefits for a child born to a mother receiving welfare. See SUPER
ET AL., supra note 18, at 8.
76. In ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 37, at para. 207, the
American bishops contend:
[S]ociety's institutions and policies should be structured so that
mothers of young children are not forced by economic necessity to
leave their children for jobs outside the home. The nation's social
welfare and tax policies should support parents' decisions to care for
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work targets, child care funding for families on welfare will suffer
a $2.4 billion shortfall.17 Yet under the new law, states are per-
mitted to require parents of children six years and older to work,
even if child care is not available.) One must similarly question
the rigid time limits incorporated under TANF of five years in a
lifetime, which, as we have seen, may leave over a million chil-
dren and their mothers bereft of support.
3. Duties correlative to basic rights imply not only
forbearance, but structural guarantees against
deprivation and aid for those deprived.78
An equitable welfare policy must, in conjunction with other
pertinent public policies, redress the structural causes of depriva-
tion; a fortiori, the form of aid must not perpetuate systemic dep-
rivation. Integral welfare policies must nurture families, provide
for dignified employment for parents and appropriate educa-
tional opportunities for their children. Yet as we have seen, work
is regarded in excessively retributive terms (the Congressional
Budget Office estimates a nearly $12 billion shortfall in work-
related costs, excluding child care) and paltry allowance made
for enhanced inner-city education (while under the former legis-
lation, education was accounted as a work-activity, the new law
may pit employment obligations against class attendance). 79 The
burden of the aforementioned reductions in nutritional benefits
and cash assistance is further aggravated by the disproportionate
housing costs borne by the poorest sector of society, e.g., by
1985, 45% of poor households expended 70% or more of their
incomes on housing.8"
4. It follows as a corollary, that appeals to the private,
charitable sector cannot displace federal, state, and local
governments' responsibility for ensuring that persons' basic
rights are satisfied.
The threefold set of duties correlative to agents' basic rights,
i.e., of forbearance, protection of the most vulnerable, and aid to
their own children and should recognize the work of parents in the
home because of its value for the family and for society.
77. Welfare Law, supra note 73, at 8. Waivers, failure to meet work
requirements, or reduction in caseloads may have possible mitigating effects.
See SUPER ET A., supra note 18, at 13-14.
78. SHUE, supra note 60, at 35-64.
79. SUPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 10-11. Contrary to the intent of the
law, caseload reduction credits may be incurred by limiting eligibility
requirements or imposing barriers to receiving aid. Id.
80. Cohen & Reeves, supra note 20, at 43.
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those deprived, are borne by citizens generally; yet typically, the
latter duties are mediated structurally, i.e., through the appropri-
ate institutions of government. Both equity and efficiency
require that appropriate, universal standards, corresponding to
persons' basic rights, e.g., of nutritional well-being and health
care, be established and suitably enforced.81 Greater allocative
efficiency, e.g., in applying the criterion of Pareto optimality to
welfare policy, must accordingly be consistent with persons'
equal rights and duties.82 Collaborative models of public and
private partnership commend themselves as even "the most opti-
mistic estimates predict that contributions to charities might
make up for only 5% of the federal cuts." 3 Indeed, private char-
ities such as Catholic Charities, USA depend upon federal subsi-
dies. "Almost half the $87 billion charities will spend in 1996 will
come from federal funds."8 4
5. The participatory rights of those most affected by welfare
policy must be honored.
As Henry Shue observes, "for a right to the liberty of partici-
pation to be of any consequence, the participation must be effec-
tive and exert some influence upon outcomes." Basic
participatory liberties are "effective" inasmuch as they exercise
"genuine influence upon the fundamental choices among the
social institutions and the social policies that control security and
subsistence and, where the person is directly affected, genuine
influence upon the operation of institutions and the implemen-
tation of policy."8 5 It follows, then, that in the design and imple-
mentation of welfare policy, the views and experience of
recipients must be respected; above all, persons must not be
81. In Shue's words:
[Alppeals for voluntary compliance with one's duty to aid others to
enjoy subsistence can be unfair, almost to the point of mild cruelty, to
the responsive. For reliance on voluntary contribution allows the
unresponsive totally to escape their fair share of the effort and
encourages the responsive to do even more than their share.
Obviously this sort of voluntarism also courts the danger of a shortfall
in the amount of transfers needed and is for this reason also unfair to
those currently deprived of their rights. Therefore, for the sake of
fairness both to those deprived of their subsistence rights and to those
who would be willing voluntarily to perform their subsistence duties to
assist, the performance of these duties ought to be a legal obligation.
Sn-m, supra note 60, at 18.
82. See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUsTlcE 65-75.
83. John Murawski, A Banner Year for Caring, CHRON. OF PH-ILANTHROPY,
May 30, 1996, at 38.
84. Cohen & Reeves, supra note 20, at 46.
85. SH-E, supra note 60, at 71.
THE ETHICS OF WELFARE REFORM
treated paternalistically as mere supplicants deprived of moral
standing.8 6 For the poor, one might say with apologies to Ernest




These, of course, are far from a panacea, nor are they
offered as definitive. Yet such criteria, illumining the oft-
neglected ethical aspect of policy, remind us that we are still "tied
in a single garment of destiny.""8 Such a "moral squint," indeed,
reveals traces of a different genealogy-one recalled in John
Winthrop's "city set upon a hill" where the world retains its mea-
sure of enchantment: "We must delight in each other, make
others condition our own, rejoice together, mourn together,
labor and suffer together, always having before our eyes our com-
munity as members of the same body."8 9
86. A recent survey of low-income Americans undertaken by the Joint
Center for Political and Economic Studies reveals a "virtual consensus among
the poor" supporting "more education and training opportunities" (95%) and
provision of "childcare to poor mothers who want to work" (94%). "Fully 85%
of the poor are in favor of a plan that emphasizes education and training, Food
Stamps, and childcare assistance for those transitioning to work, and public-
service work for those unable to find private employment." JoINT CENTER FOR
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES, NEGLECTED VOICES: WHAT LOW-INCOME
AMERICANS TmN OF WELFARE RrFORM at 4.
87. See THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 213 (3d ed. 1979).
88. Martin Luther King, Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTAMENT
OF HOPE: ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 290
(1986).
89. John Winthrop, A Model of Christian Charity, in PUImAN PoLITcIAL
IDEAS, 1558-1794 92 (Edmund S. Morgan ed., 1965).
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